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Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and
Its Testing Application
Yakov Babichenko∗ Siddharth Barman† Ron Peretz‡
Abstract
We show that in any n-player m-action normal-form game, we can obtain
an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small
number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and
coarse correlated. For each one of them we obtain upper and lower bounds
on the number of samples required for the empirical distribution over the
sampled action profiles to form an approximate equilibrium with probability
close to one.
These bounds imply that using a small number of samples we can test
whether or not players are playing according to an approximate equilibrium,
even in games where n and m are large. In addition, our results substantially
improve previously known upper bounds on the support size of approximate
equilibria in games with many players. In particular, for all the three types
of equilibria we show the existence of approximate equilibrium with support
size polylogarithmic in n and m, whereas the previously best-known upper
bounds were polynomial in n [16, 11, 15].
1 Introduction
Equilibria are central solution concepts in game theory. They are widely used as
models to explain the observed behavior of self-interested entities like human play-
ers in strategic settings. Arguably the most prominent examples of such notions
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of rationality are Nash equilibrium [21], correlated equilibrium [2], and coarse cor-
related equilibrium [14]. At a high level, these concepts denote distributions over
players’ action profiles where no player can benefit, in expectation, by unilateral
deviation. Though, in most empirical applications of game theory these underlying
distributions are not explicitly known to an observer. Rather, what one observes is
the behavior of the players, i.e., players’ realized actions.
This naturally leads us to consider a setting in which players implement an
underlying distribution—i.e., a mixed strategy—during multiple plays of the same
game. Here, the mixed strategy is not known to an outside observer. Rather, the
observer sees the (pure) actions selected by the players during the play; in other
words, she observes independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from
the mixed strategy. This framework captures typical (empirical) applications of
game theory, and entails the following fundamental question: How many samples
from an equilibrium (Nash, correlated, or coarse correlated) play are required to
ensure that the induced empirical distribution forms an approximate equilibrium1
(again, Nash, correlated, or coarse correlated)? The main objective of this paper
is to show that even in large games—i.e., games with a large number of players
and/or actions—an extremely small number of samples generate an approximate
equilibrium with high probability. This result has several useful interpretations.
1. Testing whether players are playing according to an equilibrium. In
many strategic settings, it is important to test whether players are playing according
to an equilibrium or not, but experimental data is limited and costly. Such scenarios
are studied throughout experimental economics. In such contexts it is desirable to
have tests that are reliable and require a small number of data points. Another case
wherein this testing exercise is relevant is when the same game is played multiple
times in independent environments. We observe a limited number of outcomes/data
and our goal is to analyze, through the data, whether the agents are implementing
an equilibrium. Our results (Theorems 2, 5 and Corollary 4) show that we can
accomplish this testing task even with a small dataset (i.e., few samples) that con-
sists of i.i.d. action profiles drawn from the underlying mixed strategy. Moreover
the results show that the test can be performed via a direct algorithm: we simply
need to check whether or not the empirical distribution of the observed data is an
approximate equilibrium.
2. Existence of simple approximate equilibrium. The existence of ap-
proximate equilibrium with support size polynomial in the number of players has
been established in prior work (see [1], [19], and [16]). In particular, these results
1An approximate equilibrium, with approximation parameter ε > 0, is a distribution over action
profiles at which no player has more than an ε incentive to deviate.
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show that in every normal-form game there exists an approximate equilibrium that
is simply the uniform distribution over a small set of action profiles; such approxi-
mate equilibria are referred to as simple approximate equilibria. Our result extends
this line of work by substantially improving the upper bounds on the support size of
simple approximate equilibrium. In particular, Corollaries 1 and 3 along with The-
orem 4 show that in every game there exists an approximate equilibrium of support
size polylogarithmic in n (the number of players) and m (the number of actions per
player), see Table 2.
3. Population games. Sampling occurs in life very naturally. In biology
[25], for example, members of a species come in different traits: sex, size, color,
etc. Every newborn has a trait which is sampled according to some distribution
prescribed by its species. An ecological system is abstractly modeled as a game,
where the players are species, the strategies are their traits, and mixed strategies
represent distributions of traits among individuals of a species. This abstraction
relies on the assumption that the size of the population is large enough to represent
the mixed strategy of the species faithfully. The present paper provides estimates
on what should be considered as “large enough” for such strategic reasoning. The
above situation is modeled in detail by a population game. Here, each individual
is modeled as a player, where members of the same species are identical players.
It is assumed that individuals can’t change their trait (sex, color, etc.); therefore
it is reasonable to look at (approximate) pure equilibria. The diversity of traits is
explained by assuming some source of randomization in the creation of individuals;
therefore the special interest in sampled equilibria.
Another justification for seeking such sampling-based pure equilibria was given
by Kalai [18], who viewed them as ex-post equilibria. That is, the players play a
mixed strategy equilibrium, and even after their strategies are realized they have no
incentive to modify them.
Our results can be interpreted as bounds on the minimal size of the population
that ensures an ex-post equilibrium in a population game. Kalai [18] worked in the
more general framework of semi-anonymous games. The minimal number of players
needed for such an equilibrium to emerge was studied by Azrieli and Shmaya in the
even more general framework of Lipschitz games [3]. It should be noted that the
results we obtain for the special case of population games are stronger than what
one could hope to obtain for arbitrary Lipschitz games.
4. Short-Run Stability of Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Bounded
Rationality. The premise that players do not know their opponents’ utility func-
tions is a central construct in the study of uncoupled learning in repeated games
(see [15] and [27]). A reasonable assumption along these lines is that players do
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not know the mixed strategy of their opponents. This gives us a repeated-game
model in which every player learns her opponents’ mixed strategies by observing
the actions that they play in each repetition of the game.2 In this framework, a
natural way of learning opponents’ mixed strategy is through the empirical distri-
bution (i.e., approximating opponents’ mixed strategy by the empirical distribution
of the observed action profiles). Such a learning process has been considered in the
classical fictitious play literature [23], and in many other recent results; e.g., the
regret-testing dynamics (see [10] and [12]).
Overall, we get the following key question in settings where players learn their
opponents’ mixed strategy through pure-action samples played by the opponents:
How fast does the empirical distribution of equilibrium play forms an approximate
equilibrium?
The answer to this question sheds light on the short-run stability of equilibria. If
the empirical distribution does not form an approximate equilibrium after multiple
iterations (i.e., after multiple plays), then it is likely that an impatient player—who
is uncertain about her opponents’ strategies—will infer from the observed samples
that her current mixed strategy is not a best reply to her opponents’ strategies and
deviate to some other strategy. This exact setup has been considered in [10] and
[12]. Our results imply that, even in large games, after a small number of iterations
with high probability such a situation will not occur. I.e., the equilibria are stable
in the short run.
Specifically, we provide almost tight bounds for the above question (see Table
1). These bounds in particular show that after a small number of iterations, each
player can learn whether her current strategy is approximately a best reply to her
opponents’ strategies.
1.1 Informal Statement of the Results
We consider large normal-form games with n players and m actions per player (here
at least one of the numbers n or m is large). Let x be an equilibrium of the game
(Nash, correlated, or coarse correlated), which is a distribution over the action
profiles. We observe k i.i.d. samples from x.
For the case of Nash equilibrium, since the players are playing according to a
product distribution, the correct notion for the empirical distribution of play is the
product of the empirical distributions of the actions played by each player. For
the cases of correlated and coarse correlated equilibrium the correct notion for the
2Note that this assumption holds in most repeated-game models, i.e., perfect monitoring.
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empirical distribution of play is simply the empirical distribution of the sampled
action profiles.
The empirical distribution of play is a random variable. In this paper we address
the following question: how large should the number of samples k be to guarantee
that the empirical distribution of play forms an approximate equilibrium with prob-
ability close to 1? We provide almost tight bounds for this question, which are
summarized in the table below.
Equilibrium Upper Bound Lower bound
Nash k = O(logm+ logn) k = Ω(logm+ logn)
Theorem 1 Examples 2 and 1
Correlated k = O(m logm+ logn) k = Ω(m+ logn)
Theorem 3 Examples 3 and 1
Coarse Correlated k = O(logm+ logn) k = Ω(logm+ logn)
Theorem 7 Examples 2 and 1
Table 1: Bounds on the number of samples that are required for the empirical
distribution of a play to form an approximate equilibrium with probability close to
1.
Moreover, we show that if players are playing according to a distribution that
is not an approximate equilibrium, then for the same values of k (as in the upper
bound column in Table 1), with probability close to 1, the empirical distribution
of play will not form an approximate equilibrium. Therefore, we can test whether
players are playing according to an approximate equilibrium using k samples (see
Theorems 2 and Corollaries 5 and 4). These results suggests that even in games with
a very large number of players or a very large number of actions there exists efficient
tests to determine whether players are playing according to a Nash equilibrium or
a coarse correlated equilibrium. Correlated equilibrium on the other hand is a
slightly more complicated notion in this respect. We establish this by proving that
there does exists a test for approximate correlated equilibrium that uses less than
Ω(
√
m) samples (see Theorem 6). This is in contrast to Nash equilibrium and coarse
correlated equilibrium that require only O(logm) samples.
The fact that the empirical distribution of play forms an approximate equilib-
rium with merely positive probability is interesting in its own right. The fact that
this event occurs with positive probability establishes, via the probabilistic method,
the existence of an approximate equilibrium with small support size. Note that
“support size” has different meanings in the case of Nash equilibrium and the cases
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of correlated and coarse correlated equilibrium. For Nash equilibrium the support
size is the maximum number of actions that are played with positive probability by
any single player. For correlated and coarse correlated equilibrium, the support size
is the number of action profiles that have a non-zero probability of being played in
the approximate equilibrium.
Small-support approximate Nash equilibria have been previously studied in [1],
[19], and [16]. Altho¨fer [1] along with Lipton and Young [20] studied the problem
for two-player m-action zero-sum games and established a Θ(logm) bound on the
support size. Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [19] studied the same question of general
n-player m-actions games and achieved an upper bound of O(n2 logm). He´mon et
al. [16] improved the bound of [19] to O(n logm). Our result implies the existence of
an approximate Nash equilibrium with support size O(logm+ logn) (see Corollary
1). This result gives us an algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilib-
rium with running time O(N log logN) in games where m = poly(n) (i.e., the number
of actions is not significantly larger than the number of players). Here N is the
input size of the game; see Corollary 2. Note that the running time of the best pre-
viously known algorithm for this problem is O(N logN) (see [22]). Hence, the current
paper provides an exponential improvement upon prior work in the computation of
approximate Nash equilibrium in large games.
Support-size upper bounds for exact correlated equilibria were studied by Ger-
mano and Lugosi in [11]. Specifically, they showed that every n-player m-action
game admits a correlated equilibrium with support size O(nm2). Applying the
technique of [11] we can obtain a bound of O(nm) on the support size of exact
coarse correlated equilibrium. The results in this paper prove that for approximate
correlated equilibrium and approximate coarse correlated equilibrium the size of the
support can be significantly reduced to O(logm(logm+log n)) and O(logm+log n)
respectively.
Our bounds on the support size of approximate equilibria and previously known
results are summarized in Table 2.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We consider n-player m-action games, i.e., games with n-player and m actions per
player.3 Write N := nmn to denote the input size of such games; i.e., the size of a list
3All the results in the paper hold also for the case where each player has a different number
of actions (i.e., player i has mi actions). For ease of presentation, we assume throughout that all
players have the same number of actions m.
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Approximate Equilibrium Our Results Previous Bounds
Nash O(logm+ logn) O(n logm)
Corollary 1 [16]
Correlated O(logm(logm+ logn)) Exact: O(nm2)
Theorem 4 [11]
Coarse Correlated O(logm+ logn) Exact: O(nm)
Corollary 3 [11]
Table 2: Support size of approximate equilibria.
that enumerates players’ utilities at every pure action profile. We use the following
standard notation. The set of players is [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}. The set of actions of each
player is Ai = [m] = {1, 2, ..., m}. The set of strategy profiles is A = [m]n. The set
of all probability distributions over a set B is denoted by ∆(B). Therefore, ∆(A)
is the set of all probability distributions over the action profiles, and Πi∈[n]∆(Ai)
is the set of all product distributions. For a vector v = (vj)j∈[n], we denote by
v−i := (vj)j 6=i,j∈[n] the vector that does not contain the i’th coordinate. The payoffs
of the players are normalized between 0 and 1. Specifically, the payoff function of
player i is denoted by ui : A → [0, 1] and it can be extended to ui : ∆(A) → [0, 1]
by ui(x) := Ea∼x[ui(a)].
Definition 1. A distribution over a set B is called k-uniform if it is the uniform
distribution over a size-k multiset of elements from B. Equivalently, x ∈ ∆(B) is
k-uniform iff x(b) = cb
k
for every b ∈ B where cb ∈ N. The set of all k-uniform
distributions on B is denoted ∆k(B).
3 Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Definition 2. A product distribution x = (xi)i∈[n] is an ε-Nash equilibrium if no
player can gain more than ε by deviating to another strategy. Formally, ui(x) ≥
ui(ai, x−i)− ε for every i ∈ [n] and every ai ∈ Ai.
When ε = 0 we say that x is an exact Nash equilibrium, or simply Nash equilib-
rium.
Throughout the paper we refer to ε as a constant, and derive asymptotic results
for games where at least one of the parameters m or n goes to infinity.
Assume that the players are playing according to a product distribution x =
(xi)i∈[n]. We observe k i.i.d. samples from x that are denoted (a(t))t∈[k], where
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each a(t) ∈ A. Since we assume that the players are playing according to a product
distribution, the correct interpretation of the observed data is as follows. We denote
by ski the empirical distribution of player i, defined to be the empirical distribution
of the samples (ai(t))t∈[k]. Formally, ski (ai) :=
1
k
|{t : ai(t) = ai}|. The product
empirical distribution of play is the product distribution Πi s
k
i .
The following theorem states that if players are playing according to a Nash
equilibrium then the product empirical distribution of play (which is a random vari-
able) is an ε-Nash equilibrium after k = O(logn+ logm) samples, with probability
close to 1.
Theorem 1. Let x be a Nash equilibrium of an n-player m-action game and param-
eters ε, α ∈ (0, 1). Then, the product empirical distribution of play (ski )i∈[n] defined
over k i.i.d. samples from x is an ε-Nash equilibrium with probability greater than
1− α, for every
k >
8(lnm+ lnn− lnα− ln ε+ ln 8)
ε2
= O(logm+ logn + | logα|).
We emphasize the logarithmic dependence of the number of samples k on the
probability of error α, which means that in order to reduce the probability of error
by a factor of two we should increase the number of samples only by a constant
(8 ln 2
ε2
).
A proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 3.3. We note that the bound O(logm+
log n) is tight (up to a constant factor), see Examples 1 and 2 in Section 6.
3.1 Existence of Simple Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Note that if sk is an ε-Nash equilibrium with positive probability then there exists
a multiset of k samples that forms an ε-Nash equilibrium; this claim follows from
the probabilistic method. Note also that the empirical distribution of every player
i is a k-uniform distribution (see Definition 1). This simple observation implies
the following corollary from Theorem 1. Here, we say that an approximate Nash
equilibrium
∏
i si is k-uniform if every si is a k-uniform distribution.
Corollary 1. Every n-player m-action game admits an k-uniform ε-Nash equilib-
rium for every
k >
8(lnm+ lnn− ln ε+ ln 8)
ε2
= O(logm+ log n).
This corollary guarantees the existence of an approximate equilibrium (in every
n-player m-action game) where each player uses only a small number of actions in
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her mixed strategy (at most O(logm + log n)). Another useful consequence, is the
simplicity of the probabilistic structure of the mixed strategy of each player. To see
it, consider, for example, the case of n-player 2-action games. Here, corollary 1 with
k =
⌊
8
ε2
(lnn+ ln ε+ ln 16)
⌋
+ 1 = O(logn),
implies that there exists an ε-Nash equilibrium in which each player i uses a mixed
strategy of the form ( ci
k
, 1− ci
k
), where ci ∈ N.
The fact that such a simple approximate Nash equilibrium exists allows us to find
an approximate Nash equilibrium just by exhaustively searching over all the possible
n-tuples of k-uniform strategies. Although the algorithm is simple, to the best of
our knowledge it provides the best-known running-time bound for this problem.
Corollary 2. Given an n-player m-action normal-form game and constant ε > 0,
there exists an algorithm that computes an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game in time
min{mnk, knm}, with k = O(logm+ logn).
Recall that N = nmn denotes the input size of n-player m-action games. For all
games we have
mnk = poly(Nk) ≤ poly(Nn logm) = poly(N logN),
which implies that the running time of the exhaustive search algorithm is at most
NO(logN). This bound coincides with the best-known upper bound for computing
approximate Nash equilibrium (see [22]).
For the class of games where m = poly(n) (e.g., n-player games with n2-action
games) the bound of Corollary 2 improves from N logN to N log logN :
mnk = poly(Nk) = poly(N logn) = poly(N log logN ).
For the class of games where the number of actions is constant (m = O(1)), the
bound of Corollary 2 further improves to N log log logN :
knm = N
nm log k
logN = poly(N log k) = poly(N log log logN).
3.2 Testing Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Our goal is to test whether players are playing according to an approximate Nash
equilibrium. The assumption is that the exact mixed strategies of the players are
unobserved. Instead, we observe i.i.d. samples from the underlying mixed strategies.
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Our focus is on the following question: how many samples are required to perform
this test?
Ideally, we would like to design a test that outputs the answer Y ES (with
probability close to 1) if the players are playing according to δ-Nash equilibrium,
and it returns NO (with probability close to 1), otherwise. It is easy to see that
such a test does not exist. The problem arises at the “boundary”. Consider a
distribution x that is a δ-Nash equilibrium, but every arbitrary small neighborhood
of x contains a distribution that is not a δ-Nash equilibrium (it is easy to see that
such a distribution x always exists). Then the test should distinguish between x and
distributions that are arbitrary close to x using a finite number of samples, which is
impossible. Therefore, we weaken our requirements from a test by providing a slack
of ε.
Definition 3. Given a number of samples k ∈ Z+, a function T : Ak → {Y ES,NO}
is said to be an ε-test that has error probability α for δ-Nash equilibrium if for every
product distribution x = (xi)i∈[n] ∈
∏
i∆(Ai) we have
• P(T ((a(t))t∈[k]) = Y ES) ≥ 1− α, for every x that is a δ-Nash equilibrium;
• P(T ((a(t))t∈[k]) = NO) ≥ 1 − α, for every x that is not a (δ + ε)-Nash
equilibrium.
In other words, we require that the test returns the correct answer, with proba-
bility close to 1, for all distributions that are δ-Nash equilibrium and for all distribu-
tions that are not (δ+ ε)-Nash equilibrium. We allow the test to return any answer
when the distribution is a (δ + ε)-Nash equilibrium but not a δ-Nash equilibrium.
The following theorem states that using O(logn + logm) samples we can test
whether players are playing according to an approximate Nash equilibrium. More-
over, the test is very natural, we need to simply check whether the empirical distri-
bution of play is an approximate Nash equilibrium or not.
Theorem 2. Let
T ((a(t)t∈[k]) =
{
Y ES if (ski )i∈[n] is a (δ +
ε
2
)-Nash equilibrium,
NO otherwise.
Then T is an ε-test that has error probability α for δ-Nash equilibrium, when the
number of samples
k >
72
ε2
(ln(m+ 1) + lnn− lnα− ln ε+ ln 24) = O(logm+ log n+ | logα|).
Note that the number of samples is independent of δ. Section 3.3 contains a proof
of Theorem 2.
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3.3 Proofs
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. For every n-player m-action game, every player i ∈ [n], every action
ai ∈ Ai = [m], and every product distribution of the opponents x−i = (xj)j 6=i we
have
P(|ui(ai, sk−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| ≥ ε) ≤
4e−
ε
2
2
k
ε
.
In other words, this lemma states that with probability that is exponentially (in
k) close to 1, player i is almost indifferent between the case where his opponents are
playing the original distribution x−i or the product empirical distribution sk−i.
We emphasize that this lemma is a key technical contribution of this work that
proves a novel concentration inequality for product distributions. Even though we
apply the sampling method as in [19] and [16], the fact that we use Lemma 1 instead
of some standard concentration inequality essentially enables us to significantly im-
prove upon the previously-best-know bounds. A proof of Lemma 1 is given in the
appendix.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof uses similar idea to [19] or [16]. Lemma 1 and the
choice of k guarantee that
P(|ui(ai, sk−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| ≥
ε
2
) ≤ 8e
− ε2
8
k
ε
<
α
mn
,
for every player i and every action ai ∈ [m]. Using the union bound, we get that with
probability greater then 1− α we have |ui(ai, sk−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| < ε2 , for all players
i ∈ [n] and all actions ai ∈ [m]. In such a case (ski )i∈[n] is an ε-Nash equilibrium
because
ui(ai, s
k
−i) ≤ ui(ai, x−i) +
ε
2
≤
∑
a′
i
∈Ai
ski (a
′
i)ui(a
′
i, x−i) +
ε
2
≤
∑
a′
i
∈Ai
ski (a
′
i)ui(a
′
i, s
k
−i) + ε = ui(s
k
i , s
k
−i) + ε,
where the second inequality holds because all the strategies in the support of ski are
in the support of xi, which contains only best replies to x−i.
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 1 and the choice of k guarantee that
P(|ui(ai, sk−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| ≥
ε
3
) ≤ 24e
− ε2
72
k
ε
<
α
(m+ 1)n
, (1)
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for every player i and every action ai ∈ [m]. In addition, Hoeffding’s inequality (see
[17]) guarantees that for a given x−i we have
P(|ui(ski , x−i)− ui(xi, x−i)| ≥
ε
6
) ≤ 2e− ε
2
72
k <
24e−
ε
2
72
k
ε
<
α
(m+ 1)n
, (2)
for every player i ∈ [n]. Note that there are n(m+1) inequalities of the form (1) and
(2). Therefore, the union bound implies that with probability greater than 1 − α
the following n(m+ 1) inequalities hold:
|ui(ai, sk−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| ≤
ε
6
∀i ∈ [n], ∀ai ∈ [m].
|ui(ski , x−i)− ui(xi, x−i)| ≤
ε
6
∀i ∈ [n].
(3)
Throughout the proof we will assume that all the inequalities in (3) are satisfied.
If (xi)i∈[n] is a δ-Nash equilibrium then (ski )i∈[n] is a (δ +
ε
2
)-Nash equilibrium
because
ui(ai, s
k
−i) ≤ ui(ai, x−i) +
ε
6
≤ ui(xi, x−i) + δ + ε
6
≤ ui(ski , x−i) + δ +
ε
3
=
∑
ai∈Ai
ski (ai)ui(ai, x−i)+δ+
ε
3
≤
∑
ai∈Ai
ski (ai)ui(ai, s
k
−i)+δ+
ε
2
= ui(s
k
i , s
k
−i)+δ+
ε
2
.
On the other hand, if (xi)i∈[n] is not a (δ+ε)-Nash equilibrium, then there exists
a player i and an action a∗i such that ui(a
∗
i , x−i) > ui(xi, x−i)+ δ+ ε. In such a case
(ski )i∈[n] is not a (δ +
ε
2
)-Nash equilibrium because
ui(a
∗
i , s
k
−i) ≥ ui(a∗i , x−i)−
ε
6
> ui(xi, x−i) + δ +
5ε
6
≥ ui(ski , x−i) + δ +
4ε
6
=
∑
ai∈Ai
ski (ai)ui(ai, x−i)+δ+
2ε
3
≥
∑
ai∈Ai
ski (ai)ui(ai, s
k
−i)+δ+
ε
2
= ui(s
k
i , s
k
−i)+δ+
ε
2
.
Summarizing, the choice of k guarantees that all the inequalities in (3) will be
satisfied with probability of at least 1−α. If those inequalities are satisfied then we
have the following:
- For every product distribution x that is a δ-Nash equilibrium, the product
empirical distribution is a (δ + ε
2
)-Nash equilibrium. Hence, for δ-Nash equilibria,
the given test T returns the correct answer Y ES.
- For every product distribution x that is not a (δ + ε)-Nash equilibrium, the
product empirical distribution is not a (δ + ε
2
)-Nash equilibrium. Hence, for a
distribution that is not a (δ + ε)-Nash equilibirum, the given test T returns the
correct answer NO.
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4 Approximate Correlated Equilibrium
Section 3 considered the case of product distributions, i.e., a setting in which players
followed their mixed strategies independently. We will now consider complementary
notions of equilibria that address settings in which players’ actions are correlated.
Specifically, this section is focused on correlated equilibira and the next section is
on coarse correlated equilibria.
A typical interpretation of correlated equilibrium is as follows. There exists a
mediator who samples an action profile a = (ai)i∈[n] according to a distribution
x. Then the mediator (privately) tells every player i the corresponding action ai.
We will call the drawn action ai the recommendation to player i. A distribution
x ∈ ∆(A) is an ε-correlated equilibrium if no player can gain more than ε by devi-
ating from the recommendation of the mediator. A deviation from the mediator’s
recommendation is described by a switching rule f : Ai → Ai, that corresponds
to the case where instead of the recommended action ai the player chooses to play
f(ai).
Definition 4. For every switching rule f : Ai → Ai we denote by Rif (a) :=
ui(f(ai), a−i) − ui(ai, a−i) the regret of player i for not implementing the switch-
ing rule f at strategy profile a.
A distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is an ε-correlated equilibrium if Ea∼x[Rif (a)] ≤ ε for
every player i and every switching rule f : Ai → Ai.
Unlike the case of product distributions where it was reasonable to consider the
product empirical distribution, here in the case of general (not necessarily product)
distributions we consider the empirical distribution of the sampled profiles. We
assume that players are playing according to a distribution x ∈ ∆(A). We observe
k i.i.d. samples from x that are denoted by (a(t))t∈[k] where a(t) ∈ A. Write sk for
the empirical distribution of the samples, specifically sk(a) := 1
k
|{t ∈ [k] : a(t) = a}.
We begin with stating the analogue of Theorem 1 for the case of correlated
equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Let x be a correlated equilibrium of an n-player m-action game and
parameters ε, α ∈ (0, 1). Then, the empirical distribution sk defined over k i.i.d. sam-
ples from x is an ε-correlated equilibrium with probability greater than 1 − α for
every
k >
2
ε2
(m lnm+ lnn− lnα) = O(m logm+ log n).
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The bounds of Theorem 3 are almost tight. Specifically, Example 1 in Section 6
demonstrates that the log n dependence on n is tight, and Example 3 demonstrates
that at least Ω(m) samples are required in order to form an approximate correlated
equilibrium.
The arguments for proving Theorem 3 are more direct than the Nash-equilibrium
case (i.e., Theorem 1) . A proof of Theorem 3 appears in Section 4.3.
4.1 Existence of Simple Approximate Correlated Equilib-
rium
We should emphasize again that the support of a correlated equilibrium is the num-
ber of action profiles in the support of the equilibrium. Also, note that in an n-player
m-action game the number of action profiles is mn. If we use the existence of small-
support approximate Nash equilibrium (which is also an approximate correlated
equilibrium) we obtain the existence of an approximate correlated equilibrium with
support of size O((logm+ log n)n).
By observing that Theorem 3 holds with positive probability we can deduce the
existence of approximate correlated equilibrium with support of size O(m logm +
log n). But can we obtain an approximate correlated equilibrium support size poly-
logarithmic in m, instead of a polynomial? Example 3 demonstrates that if we
sample from an arbitrary correlated equilibrium then we cannot. But, if we sample
from a specific approximate correlated equilibrium, then poly-logarithmic number
of samples will be sufficient. It turns out that the specific approximate correlated
equilibrium from which we should sample is an equilibrium in which each player uses
only a small number of her own actions in the support of the equilibrium. Existence
of such an approximate correlated equilibrium is proved in Corollary 1 (because
every approximate Nash equilibrium is also an approximate correlated equilibrium).
The following theorem shows that there always exists an approximate correlated
equilibrium with support size poly-logarithmic in n and m; moreover, the proba-
bilistic structure of the equilibrium is simple: it is a k-uniform distribution (see
Definition 1).
Theorem 4. Every n-player m-action game admits a k-uniform ε-correlated equi-
librium for every
k >
264
ε4
lnm(lnm+ lnn− ln ε+ ln 16) = O(logm(logm+ logn)) (4)
A proof of this theorem, which uses the above mentioned ideas, appears in Section
4.3.
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4.2 Testing Approximate Correlated Equilibrium Play
As in Section 3.2, we would like to design a test that uses k samples to determine
whether players are playing according to a δ-correlated equilibrium or according to
a distribution that is not a (δ + ε)-correlated equilibrium.4
Definition 5. Given a number of samples k ∈ Z+, an ε-test with error proba-
bility α for δ-correlated equilibrium that uses k-samples, is a function T : Ak →
{Y ES,NO}, such that for every distribution x ∈ ∆(A) we have
• P(T ((a(t))t∈[k]) = Y ES) ≥ 1−α for every x that is a δ-correlated equilibrium,
• P(T ((a(t))t∈[k]) = NO) ≥ 1 − α for every x that is not a (δ + ε)-correlated
equilibrium.
The following theorem states that using O(m logm+ log n) samples we can test
whether players are playing according to an approximate correlated equilibrium.
Moreover, the test is quite natural, we need to simply check whether the empirical
distribution of play is an approximate correlated equilibrium or not.
Theorem 5. Let
T ((a(t)t∈[k]) =
{
Y ES if sk is a (δ + ε
2
)-correlated equilibrium
NO otherwise.
Then T is an ε-test with an α-error-probability for δ-correlated equilibrium, when
the number of samples
k >
8
ε2
(m lnm+ lnn− lnα) = O(m logm+ log n).
Section 4.3 contains a proof of this theorem.
An unsatisfactory property of the above test is the polynomial dependence on
the number of actions. Example 3 in Section 6 demonstrate that the natural test
that is presented in the theorem cannot use less then Ω(m) samples. Hypothetically,
it could be the case that there exists some other test that uses significantly fewer
samples. The following theorem states that this is not the case. The number of
samples must be polynomial in m, even for the case where ε and α are constants.
Theorem 6. Every 1
2
-test with an error probability 1
4
for exact correlated equilib-
rium for two-player m-action games must use at least
√
m
2
samples.
See Section 4.3 for a proof.
4We note again, that it is impossible to design such a test for distinguishing between δ-correlated
equilibrium and not a δ-correlated equilibrium. This follows via arguments similar to the ones in
Section 3.2.
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4.3 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3. Note thatRif (a) where a ∼ x is a random variable that assumes
values in [−1, 1], and Ea∼sk [Rif (a)] = 1kRif (a(t)) is the average regret on the samples.
Since x is a correlated equilibrium we know that Ea∼x[Rif (a)] ≤ 0. Therefore by
Hoeffding’s inequality and the choice of k we have
P(Ea∼sk [R
i
f (a)] ≥ ε) ≤ e−
ε
2
2
k ≤ α
nmm
.
For every player i, there are mm switching rules of the form f : Ai → Ai. Hence,
summing across n players, we get that the total number of different switching rules is
nmm. Therefore, the union bound implies that with probability greater than 1− α
we have Ea∼sk [Rif (a)] < ε. Hence, with probability at least 1 − α, the empirical
distribution sk is an ε-correlated equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4. By Corollary 1, there exists an ε
2
-Nash equilibrium x where
every player i uses at most b =
⌈
32
ε2
(lnn+ lnm− ln ε+ ln 16)⌉ actions from Ai. We
denote the set of player’s i actions that are played with positive probability in x by
Bi, where |Bi| ≤ b. Let us implement the sampling method for the distribution x
which is an ε
2
-Nash equilibrium, and therefore, also an ε
2
-correlated equilibrium.
Since Ea∼x[Rif(a)] ≤ ε2 by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
Pr(Ea∼sk [R
i
f (a)] ≥ ε) ≤ e−
ε
2
8
k. (5)
Note that sk is an ε-correlated equilibrium iff Ea∼sk [Rif (a)] ≤ ε for every switch-
ing rule f : Bi → Ai (note that the number of such switching rules is at most mb
for every player). In other words, we can consider only switching rules f : Bi → Ai
instead of f : Ai → Ai, because all the recommendations to player i will be from
the set Bi.
The choice of k guarantees that
e−
ε
2
8
k <
1
nmb
. (6)
Therefore, using inequality (5) and the union bound, we get that with positive
probability Ea∼sk [R
i
f(a)] ≤ ε is satisfied for every f : Bi → Ai, which implies that
sk is an ε-correlated equilibrium. This implies, via the probabilistic method, that
such a k-uniform correlated equilibrium exists.
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Proof of Theorem 5. Hoeffding’s inequality and the choice of k guarantee that
P(|Ea∼x[Rif (a)]− Ea∼sk [Rif (a)]| ≥
ε
2
) ≤ 2e− ε8k < α
nmm
.
The total number of switching rules is nmm, therefore with probability of at least
1− α we have
|Ea∼x[Rif (a)]− Ea∼sk [Rif(a)]| <
ε
2
, (7)
for all players i and all switching rules f : Ai → Ai. Throughout the reset of the
paper, we assume that inequality (7) is satisfied for every switching rule.
If x is a δ-correlated equilibrium then
Ea∼sk [R
i
f (a)] ≤ Ea∼x[Rif (a)] +
ε
2
≤ δ + ε
2
,
which means that sk is an (δ + ε
2
)-correlated equilibrium.
If x is not a (δ + ε)-correlated equilibrium then there exists a player i and a
switching rule f ∗ such that Ea∼x[Rif∗(a)] > δ + ε. So,
Ea∼sk [R
i
f∗(a)] ≥ Ea∼x[Rif∗(a)]−
ε
2
> δ +
ε
2
,
which means that sk is not a (δ + ε
2
)-correlated equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6. Instead of proving that in 2-players m-actions games every
test must use at least k =
√
m
2
samples, we prove the equivalent statement that in
2-players (2m)-actions games every test must use at least k =
√
m samples.
We consider the same game as in Example 3 in Section 6: consider a two-players
2m-actions zero-sum game in which the players are playing matching-pennies, but
in addition to player’s i “real” action r1 ∈ [2] player i also chooses a “dummy”
action di ∈ [m] which does not influence the payoff. Formally, the payoff functions
of the players are defined by
u1((r1, d1), (r2, d2)) = 1− u2((r1, d1), (r2, d2)) =
{
1 if r1 = r2,
0 otherwise.
Consider the correlated equilibrium x where x((r1, d), (r2, d)) =
1
4m
, for every
d ∈ [m] and every r1, r2 ∈ [2]. In other words, x is the correlated equilibrium where
beyond the actual (1
2
, 1
2
) play of the real matching-pennies, the players always choose
the same dummy action.
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Let b := (bd)d∈[m] be a vector of size m, where each coordinate bd is a pair
bd ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)}. We define the distributions yb (we have 4m such
distributions) by:
yb((r1, d1), (r2, d2)) =
{
1
m
if d1 = d2 = d and (r1, r2) = bd,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Loosely speaking, the distribution yb picks for every d ∈ [m] a single action (ri, rj)
for both players and puts a measure of 1
m
on it. This is in contrast to x which puts
an equal measure of 1
4m
on all four actions (ri, rj).
Let ω be the event ω := {((r(t), d(t))t∈[k] : d(t) 6= d(t′) for t 6= t′}; i.e., all the
samples have different values of d. Note that Px(ω) = Pyb(ω) for every b, because
the event ω depends only on the samples of d, and both x and yb have the uniform
distribution over the values of d.
We claim that if k = ⌊√m⌋ then Px(ω) = Pyb(ω) > 12 (for every b).
The tth sample will have the same value d as one of the previous with probability
of at most t−1
m
. Using the union bound we get that
1− Px(ω) ≤ 0
m
+
1
m
+
2
m
+ ... +
⌊√m⌋ − 1
m
≤ (
√
m− 1)√m
2m
<
1
2
.
A test with error-probability 1
4
should return with probability 3
4
the answer
Y ES for the correlated equilibrium x, and it should return the answer NO with
probability 3
4
for all the distributions yb which are not
1
2
-correlated equilibria. In
particular, if we first draw the distribution from which we sample (according to
some probability distribution), and then sample from the chosen distribution, the
probability of an error of the test should be less than 1
4
(because for each one of
the distributions that we draw the probability of error is less than 1
4
). Let us draw
the distribution from which we sample as follows. The distribution x is chosen
with probability 1
2
, and each one of the distributions yb is chosen with probability
1
2·4m . If the sequence of samples is (r(t), d(t))t∈[k] ∈ ω then, by the symmetry
of the distributions {yb}b, the probability that it is sampled from x is equal to
the probability that it is sampled from one of the distributions yb. Therefore, for
sequences of samples in ω the test makes an error with probability of at least 1
2
, and
sequence of samples is in ω with probability of at least 1
2
. Therefore, the probability
of an error is at least 1
4
.
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5 Approximate Coarse Correlated Equilibrium
The case of coarse correlated equilibrium is the simplest one. Here we present the
results for coarse correlated equilibria without the proofs, since they are quite similar
to the proofs of the correlated equilibrium results presented in Section 4.
The key difference between coarse correlated equilibrium and correlated equilib-
rium is that in coarse correlated equilibrium every player is allowed to deviate to
one fixed pure action (irrespective of the recommendations of the mediator), instead
of allowing the player to deviate to different actions for different recommendations.
Definition 6. For every pure action j ∈ Ai we denote by Rij(a) := ui(j, a−i) −
ui(ai, a−i) the regret of player i for not choosing the action j at strategy profile a.
A distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is an ε-coarse correlated equilibrium if Ea∼x[Rij(a)] ≤ ε
for every player i and every action j ∈ Ai.
Theorem 7. Let x be a coarse correlated equilibrium of an n-player m-action game
and parameters ε, α ∈ (0, 1). Then, the empirical distribution sk defined over k
i.i.d. samples from x is an ε-coarse correlated equilibrium with probability greater
than 1− α for every
k >
2
ε2
(lnm+ lnn− lnα) = O(logm+ log n).
We can establish this theorem using the same ideas as in the proof of Theorem
3. The only difference is that here, instead of nmm inequalities (one for every Rif ,
where f : Ai → Ai), we need to satisfy only nm inequalities, one for every Rij .
This theorem gives us the following result that establishes the existence of simple
approximate coarse correlated equilibrium:
Corollary 3. Every n-player m-action game admits a k-uniform ε-coarse correlated
equilibrium for every
k >
2
ε2
(lnm+ lnn) = O(logm+ log n). (9)
This bound is tight, see Examples 1 and 2.
Analogous to Theorem 5, we have the following result for testing approximate
coarse correlated equilibrium play.
Corollary 4. Let
T ((a(t)t∈[k]) =
{
Y ES if sk is a (δ + ε
2
)-coarse correlated equilibrium,
NO otherwise.
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Then T is an ε-test with error probability α for δ-coarse correlated equilibrium for
k >
8
ε2
(lnm+ lnn− lnα) = O(logm+ log n).
The theorem follows from a proof similar to the one for Theorem 5.
6 Lower Bounds
In this section we present lower bounds for the number of samples from an equi-
librium that are required in order that the empirical distribution of play will be an
approximate equilibrium (with high probability).
The following example demonstrates that Ω(log n) samples are required for all
cases: Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and coarse-correlated equilibrium.
Example 1. Consider the following 2n-players two-actions game. We have n pairs
of players (p1i , p
2
i )i∈[n]. Player p
j
i is playing matching-pennies with his partner p
3−j
i
(the actions of the pair (p1i , p
2
i ) have no influence on the payoffs of other pairs).
Consider the Nash equilibrium where each player is playing (1
2
, 1
2
) (which is also
a correlated equilibrium and a coarse-correlated equilibrium). If the number of
samples is k ≤ logn
2
then the probability that player’s pji empirical distribution of
play will be a pure strategy is
2
(
1
2
) logn
2
≥ 1√
n
.
Therefore the probability that no player will have a pure-strategy empirical distri-
bution is at most (
1− 1√
n
)2n
≈ e−2
√
n.
Note that the requirement that no player will have a pure-strategy empirical distri-
bution is necessary for the empirical distribution of play to be a 1
2
-coarse correlated
equilibrium (and therefore it is necessary also for 1
2
-correlated and 1
2
-Nash equilib-
ria). It follows that the probability that the empirical distribution of play will form
a 1
2
-equilibrium is exponentially small in n.
The following example of Altho¨fer [1] demonstrates that Ω(logm) samples are
required for all cases: Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium and coarse-correlated
equilibrium (actually for the correlated equilibrium case Example 3 will demonstrate
a much stronger result).
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Example 2. Letm = 4b for b ∈ N, and consider the following two-players m-actions
zero-sum game.
Player 1 picks an element i ∈ [2b] (player 1 has 2b < m actions).
Player 2 picks a subset of Sj ⊂ [2b] such that |Sj| = b (player 2 has
(
2b
b
)
< m
actions).
The payoffs are defined by
u2(i, Sj) = −u1(i, Sj) =
{
1 if i ∈ Sj,
0 otherwise.
Player 1 can guarantee to pay at most 1
2
by playing the uniform distribution.
If in the support of the distribution (which might be correlated) player 1 plays at
most b different actions, then player 2 has a pure strategy that will yield a payoff of
1; therefore in every 1
4
-equilibrium (Nash, correlated or coarse-correlated) player 1
should play at least b+1 different strategies. Therefore, in order that the empirical
distribution will be a 1
4
-equilibrium the number of samples must be greater than
b = logm
2
.
The following example demonstrates that Ω(m) samples are required for the case
of correlated equilibrium.
Example 3. Consider the following two-players 2m-actions zero-sum game. The
players are playing matching-pennies, but in addition to player’s i “real” action
r1 ∈ [2] player i also chooses a “dummy” action di ∈ [m] which does not influence
the payoff. Formally, the payoff functions of the players are defined by
u1((r1, d1), (r2, d2)) = 1− u2((r1, d1), (r2, d2)) =
{
1 if r1 = r2,
0 otherwise.
Consider the correlated equilibrium x where x((r1, d), (r2, d)) =
1
4m
for every
d ∈ [m] and every r1, r2 ∈ [2]. In other words, x is the correlated equilibrium where
beyond the actual (1
2
, 1
2
) play of the real matching-pennies, the players always choose
the same dummy action.
If the number of samples is k = m, then for any d ∈ [m] the probability that it is
picked exactly once during the sampling is m 1
m
· (1− 1
m
)m−1 ≈ 1
e
. If a certain d was
picked exactly once then both players can deduce from d which action their opponent
will play. Note that the expected number of d ∈ [m] that are sampled exactly once
is m
e
. Moreover, the probability that the number of exactly-once-sampled d’s will
be smaller than m
2e
is exponentially small in m (see , e.g., [9], Lemma 4). So, with
probability that is exponentially close to 1, in the resulting uniform distribution at
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least one player may increase it’s payoff by at least 1
4e
by reacting optimally to the
opponent’s known strategy in all cases where she got the recommendation (ri, d)
where d was chosen exactly once. Therefore the empirical distribution of samples is
an 1
4e
-correlated equilibrium with probability exponentially small in m.
The focus of the paper was on the dependence of the number of samples on m
and n. However, Theorems 1, 3, and 7 proves also a dependence on ε. For the
case of Nash equilibrium, Theorem 1 proves a bound of O( 1
ε2
log(1
ε
)). Theorems 3
and 7 proves a bound of O( 1
ε2
) for correlated and coarse-correlated equilibrium. The
following example demonstrates that those bounds are tight (except for the case of
Nash equilibrium where is it almost tight).
Example 4. Consider the matching-pennies game, with the unique Nash equilib-
rium ((1
2
, 1
2
)(1
2
, 1
2
)). A necessary condition for the empirical distribution of play to
form an ε-equilibrium (Nash correlated or coarse-correlated) is that the empirical
distribution of player 1 should be (p, 1− p) where p ∈ [1
2
− ε, 1
2
+ ε]. By the central
limit theorem, after k samples, with constant probability the deviation from the
expectation (p = 1
2
) is at least 1√
k
. Therefore, if we draw k samples for k < 1
ε2
, then
with positive probability the deviation from 1
2
will be at least 1√
k
> ε.
7 Discussion
7.1 Sampling from One Type of Equilibrium to Achieve An-
other
In this paper we considered three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated, and coarse
correlated. Our high level approach was to sample from an equilibrium of a partic-
ular type to generate an approximate equilibrium of the same type. We can modify
this approach a bit and, in principle, ask the following question: How many samples
from an equilibrium of a particular type are required to generate an approximate
equilibrium of a different type?
Note that the notion of coarse correlated equilibrium is a generalization of corre-
lated equilibrium, and the latter generalizes Nash equilibrium. In general, we cannot
hope to get a more refined notion of equilibrium by sampling from a more general
one. But, hypothetically, it might be the case that fewer samples from a refined
equilibrium type are sufficient for generating an approximate equilibrium of a more
general type.
First we observe that Ω(log n + logm) samples are necessarily required to gen-
erate a coarse correlated equilibrium, even if the samples are drawn from a Nash
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equilibrium. This follows from the lower bound of Example 1 (wherein we actually
sample from a Nash equilibrium) and Example 2 (in which the counting argument
holds irrespective of the initial distribution).
So the remaining question is, can o(m) samples from a Nash equilibrium generate
an approximate correlated equilibrium? In other words, can we overcome the Ω(m)
sampling lower bound established in Example 3? The answer to this question is no.
In particular, consider the same game as in Example 3, but now draw m samples
from the Nash equilibrium where both plays are playing the uniform distribution
over their 2m actions. We say that a pair (d1, d2) appears exactly once if the pair
(d1, d2) appears in the sample (i.e., one of the samples is ((r1, d1), (r2, d2)) for some
r1, r2 ∈ [2]) and, for i = 1, 2, di appears exactly once among all the samples.
For every pair (d1, d2), the probability that it appears exactly once is equal
to m 1
m2
(1 − 2m−1
m2
)m ≈ 1
e2m
. Therefore, the expected number of recommendation
pairs, (d1, d2), that appear exactly once is
m
e2
. Hence, among the m samples a
significant fraction of pairs appear exactly once. Note that if a recommendation
appears exactly once, then both of the players can deduce their opponent’s strategy
from the recommendation, which cannot occur in an equilibrium.
7.2 Hypothesis Testing
The present paper proposes simple intuitive tests to whether players are following
some (approximate) equilibrium or behaving far from any equilibrium. The notion
of distance that we use, ε-equilibrium, is given in terms of the game incentives.
This is in contrast to the general-purpose hypothesis-testing literature that refers
to distances between distributions, such as the total variation norm.
Putting our problem in a more general context, gives rise to a question of inde-
pendent interest.
Question 1. Consider the set of all probability measures on d elements, ∆(d).
Given a polytope P ⊂ ∆(d) and ε > 0, how many independent samples from an
unknown distribution q ∈ ∆(d) are needed to ascertain with high probability that
either
• H1: q is in P , or
• H2: the total variation distance dist(q, P ) > ǫ ?
Upper bounds for Question 1 translate automatically to upper bounds for our
correlated and coarse-correlated equilibrium testing; this is because the game payoff
function is 1-Lipschitz in the total-variation norm.
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It should be noted that the upper bounds obtained in this paper are stronger
than what one could hope to deduce from total variation estimates. A special case of
Question 1, when P consists of a single point, is known as the “multinomial goodness
of fit” problem in hypothesis-testing literature [24, 8], and as the “identity testing”
problem in the computer science literature [13, 6, 4, 5, 7, 26]. For this special case
the answer to Question 1 is Θ(
√
d). Note that this special case corresponds to exact
equilibrium testing (δ = 0) in games with a unique equilibrium. Here the dimension
is d = mn; therefore an upper bound of m
n
2 is obtained. Even in this particular
case, the total variation bound is generally weaker than what we obtained. The
only exception is the case of correlated equilibrium in two-player games, where our
upper bound is O(m logm), and the total variation result suggest the possibility of
an O(m) upper bound.
Lower bounds for Question 1 do not directly translate to equilibrium testing,
because being close in payoffs does not mean being close in total variation distance.
For example, a full support equilibrium can be approximated (in terms of payoffs)
by mixed strategies of much smaller support.
7.3 Future Work
This paper establishes tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the empirical
distribution (of equilibrium play) to an approximate equilibrium. These bounds
imply the existence of small-support approximate equilibria. But, whether our poly-
logarithmic upper bounds on support size are tight remains an open question. Note
that the logm lower bound developed in Example 2 applies to support size as well. In
particular, Example 2 establishes that there does not exist an ε-equilibrium (Nash,
correlated, or coarse correlated) with support size smaller than logm. However, to
the best of our knowledge, lower bounds on support size of approximate equilibrium
(Nash, correlated, or coarse correlated) that depends on n have not been established.
Question 2. Let k = k(n,m, ε) be the smallest number such that every n-player
m-action game admits a k-uniform ǫ-equilibrium. Fix ǫ > 0 and m ∈ N (i.e., we
refer to them as constants), and denote f(n) = f(n,m, ε). What is the asymptotic
behavior of k(n)? In particular, does limn→∞ k(n) = ∞? The question remains
open for all three equilibrium types: Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated.
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A Concentration Inequality for Product Distri-
butions
Here we generalize the classic Hoeffding’s inequality [17] to product probability
spaces. In order to state our generalization we need the following definition.
Definition 7. Let (Ω, µ) be a discrete probability space. The k-sample approxima-
tion of µ is the random k-uniform distribution µ(k) ∈ ∆k(Ω) given by taking the
average of k i.i.d. samples from µ.
Formally, one can implement µ(k) by taking k independent random variables
x1, . . . , xk assuming values in Ω with distribution µ. By identifying Ω with ∆1(Ω),
µ(k) is given as the ∆k(Ω)-valued random variable
µ(k) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
xi.
The classic Hoeffding’s Inequality can be stated as follows:
Theorem 8 (Hoeffding 1963). Let (Ω, µ) be a (discrete) probability space. For
every ε > 0, k ∈ N, and f : Ω→ [0, 1]
P(|Eµ(k) [f ]− Eµ[f ]| > ε) ≤ 2e−
ε
2
2
k.
When (Ω, µ) is the product of n probability spaces, we obtain a similar inequality
in which the approximation is achieved by a product measure and the error term is
independent of n.
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Theorem 9. Let (Ω1, µ1), . . . , (Ωn, µn) be discrete probability spaces. Consider the
product space (Ω =
∏
iΩi, µ =
∏
i µi). For every ε > 0, k ∈ N, and f : Ω→ [0, 1]
P(|E∏
i
µ
(k)
i
[f ]− Eµ[f ]| > ε) ≤ 4e
− ε2
8
k
ε
.
Lemma 1 follows immediately from Theorem 9.
Proof of Lemma 1. The strategy profile sk−i is just the k-sampling approximation of
x−i.
Proof of Theorem 9. For every i ∈ [n], let us implement each µ(k)i as the average of
the k i.i.d. random variables xi1, . . . , x
i
k prescribed by the definition of k-sampling
approximation. We begin by rewriting Eµ[f ]. For every l ∈ [k], we can write
Eµ[f ] =
1
kn
∑
j1,j2,...,jn∈[k]
E[f(x1j1+l, ..., x
n
jn+l)],
where the indexes ji+ l are taken modulo k. If we take the average over all possible
l we have
Eµ[f ] =
1
kn
∑
j1,j2,...,jn∈[k]
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
E[f(x1j1+l, ..., x
n
jn+l)]. (10)
For every initial multi-index j∗ = (j1, j2, ..., jn) ∈ [k]n and every l ∈ [k], we denote
xj∗+l := (x
1
j1+l
, ..., xnjn+l) ∈ Ω, and we define the random variable
d(j∗) :=


0 if
∣∣∣∣∣ 1k ∑l∈[k]E[f(xj∗+l)]− Eµ[f ]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 ,
1 otherwise.
(11)
By the definition of d(j∗), we have
d(j∗) +
ε
2
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
E[f(xj∗+l)]− Eµ[f ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (12)
Note also that for any fixed j∗, the random variables xj∗+1, xj∗+2, . . . , xj∗+k are in-
dependent with distribution µ; therefore their average implements µ(k); therefore,
by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
E[d(j∗)] ≤ 2e− ε
2
8
k. (13)
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Using representation (10) of Eµ[f ] and inequalities (12) and (13), we get
P(|E∏
i
(µ
(k)
i
)
[f ]− Eµ[f ]| ≥ ε) =
= P


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
kn
∑
j∗∈[k]n
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
E[f(xj∗+l)]− Eµ[f ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε


≤ P

 1
kn
∑
j∗∈[k]n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
k
∑
l∈[k]
E[f(xj∗+l)]− Eµ[f ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε


≤ P

 1
kn
∑
j∗∈[k]n
d(j∗) ≥ ε
2

 ≤ 4e− ε
2
8
k
ε
,
(14)
where the last inequality follows from Markov’s inequality.
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